This book provides a historical and theoretical analysis of the Ayotzinapa social movement from the perspective of Latin American philosophy. The author addresses questions such as how a social movement is born, how (and if) the distinct social movement organizations should be defined, and what (if any) should be the extent of these organizations.

La conmoción causada por el término hermenéutica como disciplina, ha abierto una nueva escala de problemáticas en el análisis lingüístico. Sin embargo, la posibilidad de su comprensión se encuentra orientada a las claves de la fenomenología. Este es el pretexto sobre el que Heidegger, Gadamer y Ricoeur asumen un conjunto de disposiciones que orientan a la posibilidad de una hermenéutica fenomenológica. La tarea que subyace conlleva a analizar cuáles son las condiciones de posibilidad de esta hermenéutica fenomenológica de responsabilidad lingüística (...) y epistemológica que deriva en una ontología de la facticidad. (shrink)

El pensamiento kantiano y en su interior, el concepto de crítica; comprenden un capítulo de la Historia de la Filosofía considerado asidero y objeto constante de recapitulaciones. Kant advierte que el conocimiento filosófico ha llegado a un estado de crisis, y más allá aún, despoja la metafísica de las ataduras arcaicas que la esgrimían al comienzo de la época moderna. Pone al descubierto la necesidad indiscutible de una revolución teórica, que aunque no cumplió su cometido cabalmente, al permanecer en una (...) perspectiva abstracta, contiene méritos de valor en el camino a la subversión de la filosofía. Sería oportuno traer a colación, una serie de argumentos que definen este pensamiento y exponen en su sencillez la esencia de su discurso. (shrink)

Pensamiento Crítico y las Ciencias Sociales: Una mirada desde la arqueología foucaultiana, es una indagación, que propone un acercamiento historiográfico a la revista, diferente del que tradicionalmente se ha practicado. Dicha investigación, al tiempo que repasa el estado de las Ciencias Sociales en la década del 60 (sus altos y bajos), introduce la arqueología (como un método de la investigación histórica) desde el cual es posible analizar la producción científico-social de la revista Pensamiento Crítico, y que describe nuevas aristas y (...) enfoques no referidos antes por sus biógrafos. (shrink)

Kim Diaz's translation of Guillermo Hurtado's "Retratos de Luis Villoro".

En su trabajo acerca del debate Putnam-Rorty, Luis Robledo supone una concepción reduccionista de la justificación en Rorty, y defiende contra ella la indepen-dencia entre justificación y consenso, a través del argumento de la posibilidad de un consenso sin justificación. A su juicio, el no sostener una independencia tal conduciría a problemas desfavorables para el pragmatismo. En este trabajo buscaré presentar una interpretación alternativa y no reduccionista de la justificación rortiana, que aún sin reconocer una total independencia entre ambas (...) instancias, no sólo evita estos proble-mas, sino que además muestra que es poco pragmático el ejemplo proporcionado por Robledo en su argumentación. (shrink)

This book introduces readers to the topic of explanation. The insights of Plato, Aristotle, J.S. Mill and Carl Hempel are examined, and are used to argue against the view that explanation is merely a problem for the philosophy of science. Having established its importance for understanding knowledge in general, the book concludes with a bold and original explanation of explanation.

The idea that citizens have a right to receive information that is relevant for their suitable exercise of political rights and liberties is well established in democratic societies. However, this right has never been systematically analyzed, thus remaining a blurry concept. This article tackles this conceptual gap by conceptualizing citizens’ right to information. After reviewing previous approaches to this idea, I locate citizens’ right to information on the map of communication rights, and put forward a systematic framework for both justifying (...) and analyzing it. This framework focuses on this right’s grounds, its function, its holders, its content, and its correlative duties. Although the conceptualization offered here will be incomplete, it will be enough to distinguish the general concept of citizens’ right to information from both its specific conceptions and from the other two best-known rights of the public: freedom of information and the public’s right to know. (shrink)

What should be news in a democracy? This article offers a deliberative answer to this question by developing a deliberative account of newsworthiness. Drawing from the deliberative theory of democracy, I define the general criterion of deliberative newsworthiness as a mandate that commands journalists to seek, select, and report the contents that are most capable of stimulating high-quality deliberation. I then develop a two-step process through which journalists may apply this criterion. First, journalists should select the most newsworthy issues, which (...) are those that most profoundly affect (or are likely to affect) how just our society is. Second, journalists should select the most newsworthy facts and the most newsworthy arguments, both of which are to be chosen on the basis of their capacity to promote quality deliberation about the newsworthy issues. Ultimately, what should be news is a context-dependent issue that only journalists can decide, but deliberative newsworthiness is the normative criterion that journalists should follow when making these decisions – at least, if they want to produce the news that deliberative democracy needs. (shrink)

Argument that Marx has a realist ontology and a correspondence theory of truth. His views are compared to both Hegel's and Kant's. This interpretation departs from more Hegelian, 'idealist' interpretations that often rely on misunderstanding some of the work of the early Marx. There is also a discussion and partial defence of Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.

RESUMEN: En este trabajo defiendo que el ideal de una ciudadanía competente es viable incluso en los contextos adversos que ofrecen las sociedades digitales. Para ello, identifico cinco problemas que obstaculizan a la ciudadanía la adquisición de competencia política: el pluralismo, el problema del moderador, la dificultad para acceder a información relevante, la apatía política y los sesgos políticos. Aunque estos problemas se agudizan en las democracias digitales, muestro que existen mecanismos institucionales que permiten corregir y mitigar sus efectos perjudiciales (...) sobre la competencia política. Por ello, concluyo, el ideal de ciudadanía competente es prima facie factible y podría lograrse mediante la implementación de medidas institucionales que fomenten la adquisición de competencia política por parte de la ciudadanía. -/- ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue that the ideal of a competent citizenry is feasible even in the adverse context digital societies offer. To do so, I identify five problems that hinder citizens’ acquisition of political competence: pluralism, the chairman problem, difficulties in finding relevant information, political apathy, and political biases. Even though these problems worsen in digital democracies, I show that there are institutional mechanisms that allow for the correction and mitigation of the detrimental effects they might have on political competence. I thus conclude that the ideal of a competent citizenry is prima facie feasible and could be achieved through the implementation of institutional measures that foster political competence among citizens. (shrink)

Metaphysically speaking, just what is trying? There appear to be two options: to place it on the side of the mind or on the side of the world. Volitionists, who think that to try is to engage in a mental act, perhaps identical to willing and perhaps not, take the mind-side option. The second, or world-side option identifies trying to do something with one of the more basic actions by which one tries to do that thing. The trying is then (...) said to be identical with the physical action. -/- After carefully stating the second, world-side view, I produce two arguments against it. The first relies on the fact that if a=b and b=c, then a=c, sometimes put colloquially as: if something is identical to two things, then the two things must be identical to one another. In the case of trying, one might try to do something by performing a plurality of simultaneous actions, a sure sign that the relation between the trying and the plurality of actions by which one tries must be some relation other than identity. -/- The second argument discusses two cases, recorded in William James’ The Principles of Psychology, of a patient who tries but who performs no action whatever. This is sometimes called ‘naked trying’. A recent attempt at denying that there can be such cases of naked trying is examined and dismissed. (shrink)

What constitutes numerically one and the same tradition diachronically, at different times? This question is the focus of often violent dispute in societies. Is it capable of a rational resolution? Many accounts attempt that resolution with a diagnosis of ambiguity of the disputed concept-Islam, Marxism, or democracy for example. The diagnosis offered is in terms of vagueness, namely the vague criteria for sameness or similarity of central beliefs and practices.

This article explores the connections between David Hume's theory of prejudice, present-day theories of structural ignorance, and Hume's own racist attitudes. Charles Mills has identified certain types of ignorance, including racial ignorance, that result from social structures. Here, I argue that Hume can do something similar. Hume uses the concept of prejudice to theorize the misjudgment of someone based on their perceived membership of a certain group. Despite its seemingly individualist presentation in the Treatise, Hume's theory can, as a result (...) of his deeply social view of the mind, be expanded to account for social-structural influences on the formation of prejudices. In fact, in several places he himself develops such structural explanations. On the resulting picture, both his racism and his theory of prejudice are seen to play important roles in his philosophy. (shrink)

The Ethical Dimension of Science According to Mariano Artigas: Many authors have written, from different approaches, about the relationships between ethics and science. In this work, we analyze how Mariano Artigas did it. He gives great importance to ethics, which he considers a philosophical presupposition of scientific activity. A detailed analysis of his work allows to understand to what extent ethics is important for science. Specifically, we consider the relationships of ethics with humans and with science; the interweaving and the (...) distinction between both of them; the importance of ethics as a hermeneutical key in Popper; and the emergence of ethics before, during, and after scientific activity. (shrink)

In virtue of what are later and an earlier group members of one and the numerically same tradition? Gallie was one of the few philosophers to have engaged with issues surrounding this question. My article is not a faithful exegesis of Gallie but develops a terminology in which to discuss issues surrounding the numerical identity of a tradition over time, based on some of his insights.

This paper argues that Spinoza held substances other than God to be inconceivable. It uses this claim to develop a novel response to the Problem of Other Substances, the problem of explaining why some of Spinoza’s proofs for God’s existence cannot be used to prove the existence of a non-divine substance instead.

Spinoza’s epistemology aims at the development of ‘adequate’ and the removal of ‘confused’ ideas. His theory of confusion raises many questions, however. It has often been thought that the confusion of an idea is mind-relative, such that an idea might be confused in my mind but adequate in God’s. In this paper I argue that confusion cannot be mind-relative, because an idea’s confusion is determined by what it represents and for Spinoza, ideas are individuated by their representational content. Instead, I (...) propose that although it is possible to consider one and the same idea both adequately and confusedly, what such acts of considering pick up on are mind-independent features of ideas. (shrink)

Roger Penrose is known for his proposals, in collaboration with Stuart Hameroff, for quantum action in the brain. These proposals, which are still recent, have a prior, less known basis, which will be studied in the following work. First, the paper situates the framework from which a mathematical physicist like Penrose proposes to speak about consciousness. Then it shows how he understands the possible relationships between computation and consciousness and what criticism from other authors he endorses, to conclude by explaining (...) how he understands this relationship between consciousness and computation. Then, it focuses on the concept of non-locality so essential to his understanding of consciousness. With some examples, such as impossible objects or aperiodic tiling, the study addresses the concept of non-locality as Penrose understands it, and then shows how far he intends to arrive with that concept of non-locality. At all times the approach will be more philosophical than physical. (shrink)

Aunque el populismo es uno de los conceptos políticos más empleados en nuestra época, suele decirse que también es uno de los más escasamente comprendidos (Taggart 2002, 62), y hay incluso quien cree que está rodeado de un “completo caos conceptual” (Müller 2016, 11). También hay quien ha intentado clasificar diferentes aproximaciones al populismo (véase especialmente Taggart 2000, 10-22; también Panizza 2005, 2-3; Rovira Kaltwasser 2012, 186-96; Weyland 2017, 51-55). Sin embargo, lo cierto es que el principal consenso académico sobre (...) el populismo es, precisamente, que no hay ningún gran consenso sobre lo que pueda ser el populismo. Por eso hay quien dice que el populismo es un ejemplo paradigmático de lo que Gallie (1955) denominó “conceptos esencialmente controvertidos” (Weyland 2001; Mudde y Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; 2017). -/- Semejantes dificultades para acordar una definición permiten explicar por qué prácticamente cualquier texto académico sobre el populismo empieza advirtiendo que en este debate hay que andar con pies de plomo. Así las cosas, esta entrada no aspira a ofrecer ninguna definición concluyente del populismo (para intentos de ese tipo, véase Mansbridge y Macedo 2019 o Urbinati 2019b). Cada sección tiene una aspiración más modesta. La primera identifica algunas dificultades que complican la comprensión y definición del populismo. La segunda sección presenta dos rasgos en los que, a pesar de las discrepancias, la mayoría de las definiciones del populismo coinciden. La tercera ofrece una reconstrucción sintética de la teoría populista desarrollada por Laclau y Mouffe –dos de los teóricos más influyentes tanto política como académicamente. (shrink)

In this article I try to shed some light on the complex relation between democracy, political knowledge, and disinformation. To do so, I first define three related concepts which, once clarified, could facilitate our understanding of the problems digital democracies face. First, drawing from the general notion of competence, I define civic competence. Then, drawing from the general notion of knowledge, I define political knowledge. Finally, and drawing from the general notion of information, I define democratically relevant information. After clarifying (...) these concepts, I will present three epistemic positions, to which I will refer to as knowledge, ignorance, and mistake. These three epistemic positions will be further connected with informative phenomena such as disinformation, fake news, and misinformation. (shrink)

A recent quarrel over faultless disagreements assumes that disputes over evaluative sentences should be understood as regular, factual disagreements. Instead, I propose that evaluative disagreements should be understood in Lewisian terms. Language use works like a rule-governed game. In it, the assertion of an evaluative sentence is an attempt to establish one value as default in the conversation; its rejection, in turn, is in most cases the refusal to accept this move.

Las descripciones definidas pueden ser interpretadas de acuerdo con las dos lecturas propuestas por Donnellan. El presente trabajo presenta una interpretación contextualista de la lectura referencial de estas expresiones.

La teoría de los hacedores de verdad, como la vieja teoría correspondentista, intenta comprender la relación que, ligando proposiciones y hechos, resulta en la verdad (o falsedad) de las primeras. Esta teoría presenta una versión débil, que da cuenta de dicha relación en términos de la noción de implicación, y una fuerte, fundada en la relación de "ser verdadero en virtud de". La diferencia fundamental entre ambas es la adhesión y el rechazo, respectivamente, del Principio de Implicación, según el cual (...) dos proposiciones ligadas por implicación serán hechas verdaderas por el mismo hecho. El presente trabajo muestra cómo esta adhesión conduce a las versiones débiles al colapso, por lo cual sólo las versiones fuertes tienen oportunidades de prosperar. (shrink)

A discussion of three central ideas in action theory; trying to act, doing or acting, one's action causing further consequences.

The syllogism and the predicate calculus cannot account for an ontological argument in Descartes' Fifth Meditation and related texts. Descartes' notion of god relies on the analytic-synthetic distinction, which Descartes had identified before Leibniz and Kant did. I describe how the syllogism and the predicate calculus cannot explain Descartes' ontological argument; then I apply the analytic-synthetic distinction to Descartes’ idea of god.

The scope of public reason determines which political decisions should be taken according to its standards. In this paper, I defend a broad-scope view of public reason, according to which every single political decision should be justified by public reasons. In the first part, I argue that, despite the unclarity of Rawls’ position, it is compatible with the wide-scope view. In the three following parts, I refute the main arguments in favour of the narrow-scope view of public reason. Finally, I (...) offer an argument for the wide-scope view and conclude that it is preferable from the point of view of political liberalism. (shrink)

A careful elaboration and defence of holism in the philosophy of the social sciences, with regard both to particulars and properties. The last chapter addresses the issue of the irreducibility of holistic explanation in the social sciences.

John Searle sets out five statements, the relation of each to its successor being one of entailment.

Some problems in John Searle's The Construction of Social Reality. I express some doubts about his constitutive v. regulative rule distinction, and press some objections against his unanalysed idea of acceptance or agreement.

If reduction of the social to the physical fail, what options remain for understanding their relationship? Two such options are supervenience and constructivism. Both are vitiated by a similar fault. So the choices are limited: reduction after all, or emergence.

Las oraciones con predicados evaluativos son sensibles a la valoración realizada según un parámetro evaluativo contextual. Dos teorías han proporcionado explicaciones para este tipo de sensibilidad: el contextualismo y el relativismo de apreciación. En este trabajo presentaré una tercera opción que logra lo mismo que estas de una manera más sencilla. La teoría se centrará en dos pilares: una reconsideración del contenido expresado por las oraciones con predicados de gusto que parte de la articulación del parámetro evaluativo como una función (...) diádica, y los compromisos que la aserción de este tipo de oraciones impone sobre los hablantes y sobre el auditorio. Con ambas herramientas se logrará una teoría que podrá dar cuenta de acuerdos, desacuerdos y usos ecóicos de las oraciones evaluativas sin apelar a contextos de apreciación suplementarios a la teoría semántica estándar o a presupuestos de comunidad de los parámetros evaluativos. Sentences with evaluative predicates are sensitive to the valuation carried on under an evaluative parameter in the context. Two theories have provided an account for this kind of context-sensitivity: contextualism and assessment relativism. In this paper I will present a third alternative that achieves the same results in a simpler way. This theory is based on two main ideas: understanding the content expressed on the basis of an articulation of the evaluative parameter as a dyadic function, and the practical and linguistic commitments that the assertion of these sentences imposes over speakers and hearers. Both tools will result in a theory that can manage agreements, disagreements and echoic uses of evaluative sentences without the need to supplement the standard semantic theory with contexts of assessment or with presuppositions of commonality of the evaluative standard. (shrink)

A comparison of disjunctive theories of action and perception. The development of a theory of action that warrants the name, a disjunctive theory. On this theory, there is an exclusive disjunction: either an action or an event (in one sense). It follows that in that sense basic actions do not have events intrinsic to them.

Subtractive schooling is a type of pedagogy that subtracts from the student aspects of her identity in order to assimilate and reshape her identity to fit the American mainstream. Here, I question the value of assimilation as it takes place in our public school systems. Currently, immigrant children are often made to feel inadequate for being culturally different. This is detrimental to their development as students given that at their young age they do not yet have the emotional maturity to (...) know that their experience, language and culture are legitimate and valuable. My goal is to shift the focus of subtractive schooling to one that fosters the growth of students through recognition. I suggest that John Dewey’s and Paulo Freire’s pedagogy of recognition is a helpful approach to this problem. Both Dewey and Freire’s pedagogy emphasize recognition as central to their pedagogy. (shrink)

I defend the view, hardly original with me, that there is no evidence, deductive or non-deductive, for any of our causal beliefs, that does not already assume that there are some causal connections, and hence that there is no way in which experience on its own, or with causalität-free principles, can support the structure of out causal knowledge. The deductive case is perhaps obvious. In the case of non-deductive arguments, I consider how experience of constant conjunctions, together with the employment (...) of an inference to the best explanation, might lead to a causal conclusion. But I argue that such an inference would need as a premiss that the causal explanation of the constant conjunction is the best explanation of that evidence, and ‘best’ in this context requires the thought that the causal hypothesis best fits with our existing causal beliefs. (shrink)

Book synopsis: This collection of previously unpublished essays presents the newest developments in the thought of international scholars working on the explanation of action. The contributions focus on a wide range of interlocking issues relating to agency, deliberation, motivation, mental causation, teleology, interprative explanation and the ontology of actions and their reasons. Challenging numerous current orthodoxies, and offering positive suggestions from a variety of different perspectives, this book provides essential reading for anyone interested in the explanation of action.

Mind-body parallelism is the view that mind and body stand in the same “order and connection,” as Spinoza put it, or that corresponding mental and physical states have corresponding causal explanations in terms of other mental and physical states. This dissertation investigates the nature and role of mind-body parallelism, as well as other forms of parallelism, in Spinoza’s philosophy of mind. In doing so, it also considers how Spinoza’s views relate to current discussions. In present-day philosophy of mind, mind-body parallelism (...) is almost never defended. It is seen as a historical dead-end with insurmountable problems. By contrast, I argue that parallelism powerfully responds to the post-Cartesian mind-body problem (which remains with us today) and that it points a way forward in current debates. The dissertation contains five independent chapters. After an introduction that situates parallelism in relation to both Spinoza’s time and to present discussions, Chapter 1 presents an argument for parallelism aimed at a present-day audience. Chapter 2 discusses Spinoza’s own arguments for parallelism. Both chapters help to clarify what parallelism is, in part by distinguishing between several versions of the view. Chapter 3 discusses what is often considered parallelism’s most problematic feature, its rejection of mind-body interaction. I argue that by distinguishing between the post-Cartesian context in which Spinoza wrote and present-day discussions, we can see that parallelism is compatible with mental causation. Chapters 4 and 5, finally, discuss specific ways in which parallelism is at work in Spinoza’s view of the mind. In Chapter 4, I argue that parallelism is at work in Spinoza’s interesting and distinctive positions on the nature of agency and motivation. In Chapter 5, I show the role of parallelism in his representationalist theory of consciousness. A guiding thread throughout the dissertation is that parallelism presents a distinctive and interesting way to combine realism, non-reductionism and naturalism in relation to those features of human self-understanding that seem difficult to fit into a naturalistic worldview. (shrink)

El objetivo principal del artículo es hacer notar la dimensión jurídico-normativa del problema del aborto, considerando que acentuar excesivamente su dimensión ético-moral conduce a una estéril contraposición que impide una discusión serena del abortoy de su dimensión irremediablemente pública. En este sentido, aún reconociéndole su perspectiva moral, en el artículo se plantea la posibilidad de pensar el aborto como una conducta que pueda reconducirse a un modelo de regulación jurídica “blando”, dondela perspectiva moral del legislador no adquiera las características de (...) una moral común, igual para todos ,y que,por el contrario,mediante la modalidad jurídica del permiso, cada individuo ponga en acto su propia convicción moral. De ahí puede surgir una legislación en la que el aborto no sea objeto ni de un deber jurídico ni de una prohibición: abortaro no abortar, en este modelo de regulación jurídica, son decisiones que los individuos toman con base en sus propias convicciones. (shrink)

In various of my writings, both in Philosophical Studies and elsewhere, I have argued that an account of trying sentences is available that does not require quantification over alleged attempts or tryings. In particular, adverbial modification in such sentences can be dealt with, without quantification over any such particulars. In ‘Attempts’, Jonathan D. Payton (Payton, 2021) has sought to dispute my claim. In this paper, I consider his claims and reply to them. I believe that my account withstands such scrutiny.

Most theories of slurs fall into one of two families: those which understand slurring terms to involve special descriptive/informational content (however conveyed), and those which understand them to encode special emotive/expressive content. Our view is that both offer essential insights, but that part of what sets slurs apart is use-theoretic content. In particular, we urge that slurring words belong at the intersection of a number of categories in a sociolinguistic register taxonomy, one that usually includes [+slang] and [+vulgar] and always (...) includes [-polite] and [+derogatory]. Thus, e.g., what distinguishes ‘Chinese’ from ‘chink’ is neither a peculiar sort of descriptive nor emotional content, but rather the fact that ‘chink’ is lexically marked as belonging to different registers than ‘Chinese’. It is, moreover, partly such facts which makes slurring ethically unacceptable. (shrink)

Evaluative judgments imply positive or negative regard. But there are different ways in which something can be positive or negative. How do we tell them apart? According to Evaluative Sentimentalism, different evaluations (e.g., dangerousness vs. offensiveness) are grounded on different emotions (e.g., fear vs. anger). If this is the case, evaluation differentiation requires emotional awareness. Here, we test this hypothesis by looking at alexithymia, a deficit in emotional awareness consisting of problems identifying, describing, and thinking about emotions. The results of (...) Study 1 suggest that high alexithymia is not only related to problems distinguishing emotions, but also to problems distinguishing evaluations. Study 2 replicated this latter effect after controlling for individual differences in attentional impulsiveness and reflective reasoning, and found that reasoning makes an independent contribution to evaluation differentiation. These results suggest that emotional sensibilities play an irreducible role in evaluative judgment while affording a role for reasoning. (shrink)

A short story about love, suspense and criminal inclinations. Un relato literario sobre amor y proyecciones criminales.

In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). A solution to the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem of consciousness. In particular, it would be relevant to elucidate whether people’s problem intuitions (i.e. intuitions holding that conscious experience cannot be reduced to physical processes) are driven by factors related to the nature of consciousness, or rather (...) by factors that are independent of consciousness. Whether people hold problem intuitions, and what factors drive those intuitions, are largely empirical questions. However, there is a lack of empirical research on these issues to date. The results of four studies will show that (1) problem intuitions are not widespread, and (2) when they arise, they do so because of factors that are unrelated to the nature of consciousness. This suggests that consciousness is, after all, not so problematic. (shrink)

Is the thought that having a reason for action can also be the cause of the action for which it is the reason coherent? This is an attempt to say exactly what is involved in such a thought, with special reference to the case of con-reasons, reasons that count against the action the agent eventually choses.

Throughout the present text, an account of the main contributions of Luis Villoro Toranzo will be made as a tribute to three years after his death.